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This chapter analyses the dominant years of the politics of Islamophobia in 
Turkey, which roughly covers the years from the last decades of the nineteenth 
century to the late 1990s. It takes the definition of Islamophobia as the construc-
tion of Islam and Muslims as the enemy. Based on that definition, it argues that 
Islamophobia played a constitutive role in the establishment and construction of 
the modern Turkish state. First of all, the politics of Islamophobia served to 
replace the Ottoman Empire with the secular–nationalist Turkish Republic. Fol-
lowing the completion of this political transition, Islamophobia was deployed to 
produce a secular–nationalist reality, which included the forming of a secular–
nationalist society in its domestic realm, backing a Westphalian regional order 
and a Western- centric global order on its outside. The politics of Islamophobia 
remained dominant in Turkish politics until the 2000s.
 This study discusses the political function of Islamophobia in Muslim 
majority societies, concluding that Islamophobia is an important problem in 
Muslim societies as well, especially as it pertains to countries that underwent a 
radical modernization process. Second, this study examines the theoretical 
foundations of Islamophobia and asserts that only those criticisms towards Islam 
and Muslims that make the latter the enemy can be considered as Islamophobia. 
Finally, the study applies those theoretical findings to the Turkish case. Here, it 
first seeks to manifest how Islamophobia was utilized in transforming the polit-
ical form and ideological basis of the political community towards the nation- 
state and secular–nationalism before the republic was established. Then, it 
analyses how the secular republican elite deployed Islamophobia in the repro-
duction of the secular–nationalist nation- state to hold on to power until the late 
1990s.
The political function of Islamophobia
Islamophobia is often defined as ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam, unfair dis-
crimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and exclusion of 
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p. 7) ‘anti- Muslim racism’, (Bayraklı and Hafez, 2018), ‘anti- Islamic and anti- 
Muslim sentiment’ (Ogan et al., 2014) ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes or emo-
tions directed towards Islam and Muslims’ (Bleich, 2011, p. 1582) or ‘fear of 
Islam’ (Shryock, 2010). All these descriptions point at the process of antagoni-
zation of Islam and Muslims or ‘making Muslims the enemy’, (Gottschalk and 
Greenberg, 2008) especially in the Western world after the Cold War.1 Indeed, 
there is a long history of conflict and enmity between Muslims and Christians 
(or Westerners) which goes back to the Middle Ages. However, the intra- 
European wars in the first part and the presence of the Soviet threat in the later 
years of the twentieth century decreased the political importance of Islam and 
Muslims. The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism, along with the uni-
fication of Europe, put the spotlights back on Islam and Muslims (Huntington, 
1993). This process of antagonization of Islam and Muslims gained momentum 
after 9/11 and recently continued with the ISIS threat (Morgan and Poynting, 
2012). The rising population of Muslims in the last decades and the pouring of 
refugees from conflict areas and civil wars into Europe after the Arab Spring 
exacerbated the situation.
 Indeed, the study of Islamophobia has created a vast literature on the subject. 
However, this literature appears to be lacking the study of Islamophobia in 
Muslim majority countries. Islamophobia is also an important problem in 
Muslim societies. The colonial past and radical secularist policies implemented 
by the state elites have created a fertile ground for Islamophobia in Muslim 
countries. In the process of modernization, which was carried out by the state 
elites in an authoritarian way, Islam and Muslims were made the enemy. The 
dosage of Islamophobia differed among Muslim societies with respect to how 
radical the modernization process was perceived and handled. In extreme cases, 
Islamic past and symbols were wiped out, religious–conservatives were denied 
basic rights and freedoms and were politically repressed as a consequence 
(Atabaki and Zürcher, 2004). In a nutshell, there was an attempt to destroy the 
political existence of Muslims in Muslim societies through brutal means in the 
last century.
 This chapter highlights the rather systematic and institutional character of 
Islamophobia, which is backed by the state and is ingrained in the official ideo-
logy. It is a norm that resides at the centre of politics. This is because politics is 
essentially about transforming the identities of others by integrating them into an 
overarching identity (through immigration laws, for example)2 in an open polit-
ical struggle or within the framework of democratic politics. Islamophobic pol-
icies come into play when political actors fail to hegemonize by integrating 
others into themselves or reject to add them into themselves or else put pressure 
on them to give in. Consequently, they tend to make them the enemy (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985).
 For instance, in Turkey, the secularist political forces, which strived to 
produce a modern political community on the basis of a secular–nationalist iden-
tity, always kept Islamophobic politics as an option. When the republican elite 
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substantialized by the six arrows or principles of the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) – republicanism, populism, nationalism, laicism, statism, and revolution-
ism – that served as the official ideology of the Turkish state, (Parla, 1995) or 
bring religious–conservative sections of society under the overarching secular–
nationalist identity, they had a tendency to present them as enemies of the 
regime. This was also the case when the republican elite, which sought to set 
positivistic science and nationalism as new bases for the legitimacy of the polit-
ical order, failed to nationalize and rationalize Islam in order to hegemonize it 
under a secular–nationalist political project (Sakallıoğlu, 1994). Accordingly, 
Islam and Muslims were kept outside the ‘official us’. To give an example, for 
quite a long time in Turkey, women wearing headscarves were not allowed to 
enter into the Parliament and become part of the ruling circle, not to mention 
that they could not even become public servants (Shively, 2005). Moreover, 
political parties with no ties to violence or terrorist activities were closed down 
with the accusation of being hubs of anti- secularist activities.3 The secularist 
identity had therefore decided the dividing line between the centre that har-
boured those who were part of the ruling group and enjoyed public life and the 
periphery that included those who were being ruled and relegated into private 
life (Mardin, 1973). This was neither periodical nor temporary; although its vis-
ibility rose in times of increasing polarization and declined in other times, it 
always remained there.
 These qualities underline the fact that, in the politics of Muslim countries, 
Islamophobia is a constitutive element that lays out the foundations of the new 
political community. It is deployed in the political struggle over the construction 
and reproduction of a political community. This is actually not much different in 
non- Muslim societies. Despite the fact that Islamophobia is often associated with 
marginal political actors or portrayed as a political anomaly in many non- 
Muslim societies, it is also observed that mainstream political actors can easily 
and increasingly resort to the same exclusionist discourse and practices. Islamo-
phobia can turn into a norm that is utilized in organizing the totality of the polit-
ical community. The basic political function of Islamophobia in Muslim minority 
countries is to cleanse the political body from Islam and Muslims and keep them 
outside the political community by turning them into the enemy.4 Moreover, this 
serves to draw boundaries and differentiate the modern world from the ‘back-
ward’ or ‘dangerous’ Muslim world. For instance, senior British diplomat Robert 
Cooper argues that there are postmodern, modern and pre- modern worlds with 
specific rules of conduct and therefore calls for a liberal imperialism and admis-
sion of double standards in foreign policy towards the less civilized worlds 
(Cooper, 2003).5 The traces of this attitude that harbours double standards – such 
as offering Turkey a ‘privileged partnership’ instead of a full membership status 
– can be detected within European Union (EU)–Turkey membership negotiations 
as well (‘Merkel Says Still against Turkey Joining the EU’, 2015).
 Although Islamophobia is a constitutive element of the political community 
in Muslim societies, it displays itself in a different manner. In contrast to non- 
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repress or wipe out the elements that might produce difference and hinder inte-
gration with the outside, namely with the modern Western world which is 
deemed as the ‘friend’.6 That is why Islamic symbols were demolished and 
religious–conservatives were denied basic political rights and freedoms and ren-
dered politically invisible. And that’s why it causes fear and angst in the political 
circles that seek integration with the modern world as Islamic symbols and 
Muslims gain larger visibility and presence in public life.7 While Islamophobia 
establishes division lines with the outside and serves as a ‘wall’ between us and 
them in the non- Muslim case, it is deployed for integrating the political com-
munity with the outside and serves as a ‘bridge’ between us and them in 
Muslims countries.8
 The basic tenet of Islamophobia in a Muslim society such as Turkey is, there-
fore, rejection of the political existence of the Islamic civilization and Muslims 
in order to integrate with the modern Western civilization. Accordingly, Islam is 
provincialized and reduced to a particularistic position. Religious–conservative 
sections of society, on the other hand, are subjected to policies of assimilation 
and otherization. In doing that, Islam is argued to belong to the pre- modern era 
or not applicable in the modern world. In other words, it is claimed that Islam is 
culturally backward, conflicting with modern science, strategically incompetent 
and a hindrance to progress in our time. The institutional outcome of this 
historical–cultural break is replacing Islamic political concepts and institutions 
with modern Western concepts and institutions.9
 One of the major institutional changes is replacing empires, which claimed 
universal sovereignty, with particularistic territorial nation- states. In terms of 
Islamophobia and among its many other functions, the nation- state serves double 
purposes in a Muslim country like Turkey. On one hand, as a political tool, the 
nation- state facilitates the integration of Muslim majority communities into the 
modern world (the secularist dimension). On the other hand, it ensures that 
Muslim majority communities produce a political difference with the outside 
with their own sovereign polities (the nationalist dimension). The nation- state 
thus helps to tackle one of the important problems of modern international rela-
tions, which is the handling of the problem of inside/outside (Walker, 1993).
Islamophobia through the lenses of Carl Schmitt
To analyse above- mentioned problem properly, we have to focus on one of the 
major definitions of Islamophobia, which is ‘making Muslims the enemy’ and 
discuss what it means to make someone or some group of people the enemy. 
Since the meaning of any concept could be understood in relation to its opposite, 
the enemy can only be understood by comparing it with its polar opposite, the 
friend. As Carl Schmitt puts forward: ‘The distinction of friend and enemy 
denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association 
or dissociation’ (Schmitt, 2007, p. 27). Rather, the enemy is the one who is 
outside of ‘us’ or outside the political collectivity we form. The enemy does not 
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2007). To be evil, ugly or backward does not make someone our enemy, 
although we resort to these non- political categories when producing our enemy. 
It does not need a specific content, since any content that can produce an intense 
separation between us and them is capable of creating an enemy. Therefore, the 
enemy is rather a matter of the intensity of the differences between the inside 
and the outside of a political collectivity and, as the intensity of the differences 
increases, the level of animosity mounts accordingly (Morgenthau, 2012). The 
enemy, thus, refers to other collectivities of people who are outside the bound-
aries of the nation- state.10
 According to Schmitt, either the enemy should be other political collectivities 
or the enemy within a society could only exist before the state is formed, that is 
in the state of nature or the state of war in which everyone is against everyone 
else (Hobbes, 1962). However, as we observe in the discussion of Islamophobia, 
the enemy could also be within the state. Can the enemy be within the state? 
This raises the issue of social cohesion in the state. There are three degrees of 
social cohesion on the basis of the nature of the inter- relations between fellow 
citizens that can be found in society (Schmitt, 2000). At the top of it lies consen-
sus on social values and principles. The whole society may gather around a 
certain set of ethical–political values. Members of a society perceive each other 
as ‘friends’ and each defines his identity and interests not independently from 
the others in the society. This transcendental form of society characterizes a 
rather communitarian and Hegelian type of political community (Taylor, 1984).
 This is followed by another situation where society is divided into multiple 
social groups on the basis of value or identity differences. Here, members of a 
society perceive each other as ‘rival’ or ‘adversary’. Despite individuals defining 
their identity, values and interests differently than others, they at least share 
some form of interests such as accepting the rules of competition among each 
other. Here, the consensus is merely over the rules of conflict, which are the 
basic elements of any political order. In this instrumentalist type of society, one 
can at least find a political order that allows for fair and open elections and a 
peaceful transfer of power among rival political forces. This poses a rather ago-
nistic democratic order (Mouffe, 2000).
 Both political orders, in which everybody views others as friends or rivals, 
require an enemy outside its borders. The enemies are those other political col-
lectivities that do not share our cultural values, national identity or ethic- political 
principles. If there is not an enemy outside the borders, the enemy is produced 
within the borders. Here, we find a form of society in which members of the 
society perceive each other as ‘enemy’. In this situation, individuals or social 
groups neither share a common identity and interest nor the rules of competition 
among each other. Rather, what members of the society share is a common 
understanding based on not attacking each other, pacta sund servanda. One can 
argue that, in this situation, the key to political order is the presence of a balance 
of threats that keeps the society from dissolving or plunging into a bloody civil 
war. This poses a rather anarchic and antagonistic political situation that can 
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 The society may evolve into any of these three generic political situations. 
Friends can become rivals and rivals can turn into enemies. This devolution to a 
Hobbesian situation can sometimes be limited to some sections of the society. 
Social groups, especially ethnic and religious minorities, may face a situation in 
which they are portrayed as the enemy of the society and the state. Indeed, every 
political order for it rests on a specific definition of us or an identity involves 
some sort of exclusion. They are constructed as outsiders and pushed to the 
outside of the political community. Their political demands are disregarded and 
even some of their basic rights can be breached. As noted above, this is likely to 
happen when the inclusiveness of the state declines, especially as a result of 
finding an enemy outside the national borders. When the state fails to include 
social groups into the political community on the basis of a common enemy 
outside itself, it tends to antagonize and securitize their demands and rights. As 
mentioned above, the decline of the communist or Soviet threat led to the emer-
gence and rise of Islamophobia in the West. Islamic symbols and some Muslim 
practices, such as the wearing of the headscarf or burqa and even circumcision, 
have suddenly become a security problem. Why were they not a security threat 
during the Cold War?
 All in all, Muslims in Muslim minority societies should interact with others 
in constructing the values and rules of political life. They have to participate and 
take responsibility in sustaining the political order. In that interaction, the state, 
along with major political actors, attempts to gain the consent of Muslims and 
enter into bargaining with them – this is most likely since Muslims are a 
minority – by satisfying their demands and integrating them into their political 
project. Muslims have the right not to give their consent and to expect more, just 
as those political actors have the right to criticize Muslims in return. However, 
this critique of Muslims should not reach to the level of making Muslims the 
enemy. In that case, we can start talking about Islamophobia, especially if it 
extends to an essentialist opposition to Islam and Muslims. Muslims should be 
friends or rivals in those democratic political settings, not the enemy. This is also 
true for Muslim majority societies. The religious–conservative social groups 
should not be made the enemy and put outside the political community. To reit-
erate, this is only viable as the state or main political actors find a common 
enemy outside the borders. As the friend–enemy distinction with the outside 
wanes, it inevitably pops up within borders. The enemy is constitutive in build-
ing the political community.
The politics of Islamophobia in Turkey
To understand Islamophobia in a Muslim majority society, one should look at 
how it is related to the construction and reproduction of the political community. 
If Islam and Muslims are made the enemy and systematically kept outside the 
political community, we can say that Islamophobic policies are already underway. 
Since Islam serves as the central value system and religious–conservative social 
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majority societies. This is because it is very difficult for political actors to 
produce an inclusive identity without coming to terms with Islam and religious–
conservative social groups. This becomes a much more difficult task since polit-
ical actors are supposed to modernize the country as well. This is especially 
more likely when modernization is equated with Westernization. In that case, the 
local value system and their representatives, meaning Islam and Muslims, 
become the natural enemy. In order to unite with the West or produce a Western 
identity, Islam and Muslims are taken as the outside and made the enemy. That 
is why, in many Muslim majority countries, political life is mainly determined 
by the polarization between the secularists and the conservatives.
 Turkish politics is not an exception in this regard. In Turkish politics, the 
main line of conflict or division has been between the Turkish–Islamic tradition 
and the secularist Westernist politics since the nineteenth century (Mardin, 
1973). From the nineteenth century onwards, the alliance of bureaucracy with 
local notables has strived to produce a modern or Westernized political com-
munity by secularizing politics (İnancık, 1941). This search for a secular 
Western- style politics had two dimensions. One of them was the transformation 
of the political form from ancient to modern by following the French example of 
1789 through which the Islamic content was emptied out from the locus of 
power. In fact, this did not mean that the locus of power was supposed to be 
filled with a more appropriate, that is, secularist, content. Modernization, secu-
larization or democratization of politics basically implies that ‘the locus of 
power becomes an empty place’,11 it has to remain empty. For instance, elections 
in democratic politics are one of the major indicators or providers of the empti-
ness of the locus of power: 
At the moment of elections, the whole hierarchic network of social relations 
is in a way suspended, put in parentheses; ‘society’ as an organic unity 
ceases to exist, it changes into a contingent collection of atomized indi-
viduals, of abstract units, and the result depends on a purely quantitative 
mechanism of counting.
(Zizek, 1989, p. 157)
Elections show that power belongs to no one or can belong to anyone.
 This transformation involved the decline of the role played by religion or any 
other transcendental source of power that claims to fill the locus of power in 
political life; whereas the other dimension was about providing a secular ideo-
logical content to this new modern political form (Berkes, 1998). There are two 
crucial points here. The first is that the politics of secularism in Turkey inclined 
to Islamophobia since, in order to empty the locus of power, Islam and any other 
transcendental source of power in politics had to be delegitimized. The other 
point is that, since modernization was equated with Westernization, the secular-
ist elite tended to make Islam and Muslims the enemy in their struggle to 
produce a secular–nationalist political order. With its political form – the modern 
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and Muslims functioned as the enemy. The sacred alliance between the bureau-
cracy and local notables deployed Islamophobia in order to further their political 
interests, which was to seize the state power in order to Westernize the country.
From ancient to modern politics
The basic difference between the ancient and modern political forms is found at 
the ontological level. In pre- modern times, political order was claimed to be the 
reflection of cosmic order on Earth. Its legitimacy, therefore, came from the 
outside, from the metaphysical world. As long as it lived up to the transcendental 
truth, political order was regarded as stable and healthy and those in a position 
of rule were considered successful in their task so long as stability was sustained. 
Indeed, the central task of politics was to guarantee and maintain the correspond-
ence between the metaphysical and physical worlds (Larkins, 2010).
 In Turkish–Islamic political thought and practice, this was formulated with 
the concept of nizam-­ı­alem (the order of universe). Nizam-­ı­alem was carried 
out by keeping each component of political order – the Sultan, the ruling class, 
and the common people – in its proper place. This was deemed to be key to 
render justice, which was the central concept in Turkish–Islamic political 
thought. The main task of the Sultan, who was regarded as the extra- political 
figure, was to sustain justice by arranging the relations between the ruling class 
(askeriyye) and the people (reaya) (İnalcık, 1958).
 In this hierarchic political form, therefore, the locus of power was not empty. 
It was filled with certain transcendental truth and a limited number of people 
were claimed to have access to this truth. Moreover, the representatives of this 
metaphysical truth in the physical world occupied places of power. They sus-
tained the connection between these two worlds. Hence, the Sultan had a divine 
right to rule, he was believed to be awarded with kut.12 The Sultan was identified 
with power and was designed as the natural ruler, whereas the rest were rele-
gated to the position of the ruled (İnalcık, 1958).
 Secularization of politics, in principle, involved emptying the locus of power. 
It introduced anarchy and a new division in the political universe, a division 
between the state and society. This encapsulated setting politics free from any 
higher authority, such as religion or morality. Politics became autonomous, an 
independent realm with its own rules and ethics. This process of freeing politics 
involved delegitimizing the metaphysical world, denying its role in socio- 
political life, and emptying the locus of power by forcing the Sultan to share 
power with the others through introducing the parliamentary system (shifting 
from absolute to constitutional monarchy) or eliminating the Sultanate altogether 
(shifting from monarchy to republic).13 Since there was no transcendental truth 
outside us, political order could not be legitimized with reference to the meta-
physical world and the place of power could not be identified with the Sultan. 
This created the problem of finding a new source of political authority. The 
political order, therefore, had to turn to itself in order to sustain its own legiti-
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Anarchic and self- organizing politics replaced hierarchy (Rasch, 2004). This 
immanent source was determined to be popular sovereignty or the political com-
munity itself. The people’s or national interest thus had to be the ultimate source 
behind every decision made by the state. Popular sovereignty and national 
interest have become the ground for legitimacy in politics.
 This process of secularization of politics in the Ottoman Empire encompassed 
a long time period (İnalcık, 1968). It followed a double and interacting process 
of de- sacralizing politics and gradually limiting and destroying the Sultanate (in 
1922) and then the Caliphate (in 1924). To legitimize the de- sacralization of pol-
itics, secularist forces resorted to two discourses in order to make Islam the 
enemy: the culturalist and the realpolitik discourses. The culturalist line of argu-
ment took pains to assimilate Islamic history into ‘universal’ European history 
and argued that Islam shared the darkness and ignorance of the European Middle 
Ages, that it was something to be feared of and kept outside. Islam was claimed 
to be the primary obstacle and regressive force in front of both individual and 
collective freedom and progress (Akşin, 2018).
 The realpolitik line of argument, on the other hand, asserted that Islam was 
the major reason why the empire lagged behind the European powers. Islam was 
claimed to obstruct the introduction and the application of modern ways of 
warring and adaptation to modern international politics (Quataert, 2013). Not to 
mention that Islam hindered the introduction of modern sciences and mass 
education, which facilitated the industrial revolution in Europe. In contrast to 
these anti- Islamic arguments, the proponents of Islam contended that Islam was 
the only legitimate source and served as the truest guide for conducting politics 
and that the reason why the empire lagged behind was that the state and society 
ceased and failed to follow the Islamic rules (Okumuş, 1999).
 De- sacralization of politics was coupled with the emptying of the locus of 
power and transformed it into a modern political form. The first step was the 
limitation of the Sultan’s power. In order to ensure this, secularist forces, mainly 
the bureaucratic class that took modern education and succumbed into the mate-
rialist culture that was prevalent in European capitals at that time, strived to 
transform the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy in 1876 (Mardin, 
2000). After this attempt failed due to the resistance by Sultan Abdulhamid II, 
the anti- monarchist alliance of the bureaucrats and local notables gathered forces 
and pressed for the second time for a transition into constitutional monarchy in 
1908 (Kansu, 2017). In the run- up to 1908, Abdulhamid was called the ‘Red 
Sultan’, which denoted his rule with an iron fist, and slogans from the French 
revolution of 1789, ‘freedom, equality, and brotherhood’, were chanted on the 
streets.14 The Sultan was finally toppled by a military coup and replaced with a 
more benign figure. Accordingly, in the post- 1908 period, the Sultan lost his 
standing, especially after 1913 as the Committee of Union and Progress took 
control over the empire and ruled singlehandedly (Hanioğlu, 2001). The secular 
alliance, in the end, crushed the Sultanate in 1922 and proclaimed the republic in 
1923. The founding fathers of the republic argued that the people was the new 
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Finally, popular sovereignty replaced nizam-­ı­ alem as the source of political 
authority (İnalcık, 1998).
 These transformations were supposed to bring about a modern democratic 
form of politics where the metaphysical world played no role in politics, the 
locus of power was emptied of the Sultan, and the qualitative difference between 
the ruling and the ruled was wiped out for good. In line with republican ideals, 
power was supposed to become accessible to everyone, since domination was no 
more acceptable (Laborde and Maynor, 2008). In this new political order, no one 
was supposed to have the right to rule before entering into and winning the com-
petition for power. Moreover, power was supposed to belong to no one and the 
place of power could only be occupied for a temporary time until the next elec-
tions through which a new government was formed (Lefort, 1988). These colos-
sal changes were supposed to introduce the phenomenon of ‘democratic’ conflict 
and contingency into Turkish political life. Yet, after the collapse of the mon-
archy in 1922, a secularist autocratic regime was institutionalized. It was a 
republican regime in theory, but an autocratic regime in practice. Thus, the 
ensuing conflict was between the supporters of a secularist autocracy who tended 
to make Islam and Muslims the enemy and those who sought to democratize 
politics. This conflict took place on two fronts.
Popular sovereignty and its rivals
At first sight, the order of 1923 seemed to have institutionalized a modern demo-
cratic political structure in Turkey. Yet, in practice, Turkey’s political and ideo-
logical transformation from the nineteenth century to 1923 produced an 
autocratic regime, whose essence was to control the state and not to share power 
with others (Köker, 2004). The difference between what was written and what 
was practiced paved the way for an inexorable struggle over the basis of political 
authority.
 Despite the fact that the republican regime declared popular sovereignty to be 
the new basis of authority, the republican elite that was composed of bureau-
cracy and local notables struggled to base political authority on alternative 
sources. The discourse of popular sovereignty was used to topple the old monar-
chical system, although it was not institutionalized in practice. That is why the 
political process that took place between 1908 and 1923 is depicted as a ‘liberal’ 
revolution. (Kansu, 2008). The reason for that was that people were still loyal to 
Islamic ethos and making them the basis of authority was deemed counter- 
productive to the secular transformation in the country (Mardin, 1991). The 
secular elite thus often argued that the country was not ready for a democratic 
transition and Turkey had special conditions that did not allow for an organized 
popular opposition (Heper, 2006). In their mind, the country would only be 
ready for a democratic transition when the society lost its ties with Islamic ethos 
and the local symbolic world, embracing the secular world- view. Islamophobia, 
turning Islam and Muslims into the enemy, functioned here as a factor that hin-
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 Accordingly, the bureaucracy has put forward the state as the basis of polit-
ical authority and engaged in rendering the society ready for a democratic trans-
ition. This required the introduction and the top- down application of secularist 
revolutionary laws or Ataturk’s codes, such as changing the alphabet from 
Arabic to Latin, enforcing Western style of clothing, replacing local civil laws 
with Western civil laws, closing down religious seminaries, dervish convents, 
and madrasas, rendering secular education obligatory and forbidding the pilgrim-
age (hadj) (Zürcher, 2004). The primary contradiction of those codes was that 
people’s opinion was not taken into consideration. In a genuine democratic 
regime or a republic where popular sovereignty is the norm, one would at least 
expect that the government would present the reforms to people’s vote in a refer-
endum before legalizing them. However, this did not happen.
 Authoritarian politics led to an autocratic political institutionalization where 
the locus of power was kept filled with a secular–nationalist content and the 
ruling and the ruled were separated on that essentialist basis. This was a real step 
back from the secularization of political life in the country in terms of political 
form. In this new regime, bearing the secular–nationalist identity or pursuing 
secularist politics became the new basis for the separation of the ruling from the 
ruled, or of the one inside from the one outside the official us. Those who bore a 
secular–nationalist identity were deemed to be natural members of the ruling 
group, whereas others were relegated to the position of the ruled. This amounted 
to pushing religious–conservative social groups into outside of the political com-
munity. They were targeted as the enemy of the state. Therefore, the basis of 
sovereignty was not the people but the secularist regime or identity. The deci-
sions of the state were taken on the basis of the secular–nationalist identity. 
Those decisions were considered legitimate as long as they were in line with the 
secular–nationalist identity and furthered the secularization or Westernization of 
the country. The national interest of the state, too, was determined within the 
boundaries of the secular–nationalist identity (Zarakol, 2011).
 This non- democratic political context produced a single- party regime. The 
single- party regime did not allow for multiple political parties, prevented 
the conduction of free and fair elections, and kept the opposition from entering the 
Parliament and sharing power with the government (Tunçay, 1981). Doing 
the reverse would mean setting politics free, rendering the sovereignty of secu-
larist politics questionable. Therefore, the republican regime in Turkey violated 
the basic principle of democratic politics, which involves abiding by the prin-
ciple of keeping the locus of power empty. The locus of power was filled with 
the secular elite gathered around the Republican People’s Party (RPP). They 
acted as if they owned the state and the sphere of democratic politics was kept 
closed to the opposition. The two attempts to switch to a multi- party democratic 
regime in 1925 and 1930 were short lived. The Progressive Republican Party 
(PRP) in 1925 and the Free Party (FP) in 1930 were closed down by the regime 
on account of being the hub of anti- secularist politics. The societal upheavals 
against the secularist revolutionary laws were repressed with the same Islamo-
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Independence Tribunals (Zürcher, 2004). For the republican regime, the threat of 
Islam and the old imperial regime was still alive.
 However, in the 1940s, the secular alliance between the bureaucracy and local 
notables started to be shattered. One of the primary reasons for that was that the 
logic of politics and economics, despite being shaped by mundane concerns, 
were no more in agreement.16 The logic of economics desired to arrange a polit-
ical system in order to create economic wealth and material benefit for everyone. 
The logic of politics, on the other hand, sought to arrange the political system in 
order to further the regime’s secular ideological goals, thus keeping the control 
of the state. The notables, who tended to act according to the logic of economics 
within the RPP, also saw that the regime could not sustain itself if democrat-
ization was not introduced. The notables understood democratization as opening 
up a sphere of freedom for people both in the realm of politics, which meant 
switching to a multi- party system, and in the realm of civil society, which meant 
loosening the state’s control of economic activities.
 As a result of this friction in the secular alliance, the Democratic Party (DP) was 
established in 1946 by local notables who broke off of the RPP. Turkey switched 
to a multi- party system in 1946 and the DP won the first next elections in 1950 
(Karpat, 1959). DP’s election motto was revolutionary: ‘Enough, it’s people’s 
turn!’ The DP’s main strategy was to shift the basis of authority in the political 
system (Demirel, 2016). Despite the fact that it represented the interests of local 
notables and the bourgeois (although not all of them, especially the so- called ‘big 
business’ were not convinced of the necessity to ally with the people against the 
secular bureaucracy) in general, it did not shy away from allying with the people. It 
used popular sovereignty for its political interests. As a party of local notables and 
the petty bourgeois, DP’s first choice for the basis of authority was naturally the 
individual or the entrepreneur, not the people. Indeed, ideologically, DP was a 
liberal political party, not a democratic one. Thus, 1950 started a new era in 
Turkish politics, an alliance between the people and the notables versus the secular 
bureaucracy. In other words, the politics of popular sovereignty plus individual 
freedom versus the bureaucratic oligarchy became the major front of political con-
flict. Yet, we should note that the politics of popular sovereignty or national will 
was always in a secondary position to the politics of individual rights and freedoms 
within the anti- bureaucratic oligarchy alliance.
 This new alliance softened the antagonism between secular and religious–
conservative politics. This softened the secularist stance towards religion in the 
period between 1950 and 1960. For instance, it was decided that the call to 
prayer (ezan) was to be recited in Turkish in the 1930s in the context of the pol-
itics of de- Islamization and the DP reintroduced the practice of reciting the call 
to prayer in Arabic. Moreover, the party took the initiative to open up theology 
departments in universities and to establish religious vocational schools. Again, 
it decided to have radio shows on religious matters and that included the recita-
tion of Qur’an.
 The secular notables and religious–conservative masses came together for a 
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democratization of politics. Hence, the secular–religious antagonism, which had 
determined Turkish politics for many decades, was replaced by a new antago-
nism of democracy versus authoritarianism after the 1950s. This was the strategy 
of the democratic opposition since then. They argued that authoritarianism was 
the new enemy of a democratic political order. In response, the state bureaucracy 
kept Islam and Muslims as the enemy and placed the left as another enemy of 
the regime until 1989. However, the notables understood democracy as the 
increase of individual rights and freedoms against the state, whereas the 
religious–conservative masses viewed it as the domination of the national will in 
politics. Even though this caused frictions and periodical dissolutions within the 
democratic alliance, the presence of a common rival, meaning the authoritarian 
bureaucracy, kept the democratic alliance floating for a long period of time.
 The bureaucracy’s response to the shift to the multi- party system and the 
election victory of the democratic alliance was to end the process of democrat-
ization by way of a military coup in 1960. One of the major justifications of the 
coup was that the DP had become the hub of anti- secular activities, with, for 
example, the re- Arabization of the call to prayer and the allowing of religious 
figures and symbols in the public sphere. The DP’s attempt to re- include Islam 
and religious–conservative social sections into the political community worried 
the secularist forces in the bureaucracy that still kept control of the state. Accord-
ingly, the secularist elite created a new institutional design based on bureaucratic 
tutelage and that limited the role and sphere of democratic politics in the after-
math of the coup. Two steps were taken in the construction of the bureaucratic 
tutelage. One of them was to introduce new institutions such as the Constitu-
tional Court, the National Security Board, the Military High Court, the Supreme 
Military Council, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television, the Supreme 
Council of Judges and Lawyers, the Board of Higher Education and the Higher 
Military Administrative Court. This set of new institutions served as a protective 
belt for the republican regime under the control of secular bureaucracy. Their 
basic political function was to limit or contain the transformative role of civil 
politics over the state. For the bureaucratic establishment, the obstruction of the 
arrangement of politics according to popular sovereignty has always been a 
primary political goal.
 The other step was to keep the head of civil politics down. For this purpose, 
the 1961 Constitution divided the legislative into two branches, where the higher 
branch of the Parliament was designed to be populated by members of the secu-
larist bureaucracy, such as retired judges and military generals. The 1982 Consti-
tution that was produced after the 1980 military intervention, on the other hand, 
divided the executive into two parts by empowering the President with large 
powers against the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The Turkish President, who 
was chosen by the Parliament among the retired bureaucrats or bureaucracy- 
friendly senior politicians, was considered to be a check- and-balance over civil 
politics within the institution of politics (Karpat, 2007).
 When these two steps failed to contain politics or when civil politics failed to 
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tutelage, either the military directly intervened into politics – with the 1960, 
1971 and 1980 military coups – or the judiciary stepped in to neutralize politi-
cians or political parties – with, for example, the closing down of the ruling 
Islamist Welfare Party (WF ) in January 1998 by the Constitutional Court – 
which were perceived to cross the red lines of the regime and were shaped 
around the protection of the secularist republican order.
 In all these military or judiciary interventions, one could observe the common 
accusations that civil politics led Turkey back to the darkness of the Islamist past 
or losing national independence since the Islamists or the Sultan were accused of 
allying with the occupying forces against the national forces during the War of 
Independence. These two fears based on Islamophobia have always been fed into 
the public’s mind in order to garner public support for bureaucratic interventions 
into civil politics and to keep the public in line with the regime at other times. 
The secularist civil society played a significant role both in the 1960 and 1997 
interventions (‘Bir Dakika Karanlık ve 28 Şubat’, 2014).
Secular–nationalist identity
The other front was over defining the political community or nation since, at 
least in principle, the basis of political authority was the people. To hold on to 
power, the republican elite had to do more than champion the bureaucratic 
authority against the authority of the national will or popular sovereignty. They 
had to hegemonize the social realm by producing the most inclusive identity, or 
the conception of political community. The political community that the repub-
lican elite based its rule on was constructed around a secular–nationalist identity.
 The production of this secular–nationalist political community had several 
moments. The first moment encapsulated the integration of Turkey into the 
modern Western civilization and cutting off its ties with the Islamic civilization. 
One of the strategies for that involved the denial of the existence of multiple civ-
ilizations or degrading other civilizations, including the Islamic one, to particu-
larity in the face of Western superiority or universality. The motto of that goal 
was ‘to catch up with the modern civilization’ (Belge, 2009). This led to the por-
trayal of Islam as belonging to the pre- modern past and questioning its viability 
in modern times. In this way, the republic, or modern Turkey, was cleansed of 
Islamic elements. If Islam could not belong to the modern times, modern Turkey 
was not argued to have or need to have ties with Islam.
 Another strategy to integrate Turkey into the Western world was constructing 
a new past, which was bereft of Islam, for modern Turkey (Bora, 2015). This 
involved the de- emphasis on Turkey’s Islamic past and the discovery and 
reinforcement of the pre- Islamic history of the Turks. This secularist narrative 
had different versions. One of them was that, in pre- Islamic times the Turks 
were claimed to have ancestral ties with the Sumerians, whom were also claimed 
to be the ancestors of modern (Western) civilization. Thus, according to this nar-
rative, the Turks and the Westerners used to be together in the past, although the 
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Islam. Now, the Turks were thus returning to their real home, joining with their 
Western brothers.
 The second moment was to produce Turkey’s difference on the basis of Western 
universality. In the past, the Ottoman Empire claimed to represent the universal by 
being the real heir of the Roman Empire (Necipoğlu, 1989). Thus, the Ottomans 
tended to particularize European powers by locating themselves at the position of 
universality. Starting with the seventeenth century, as they weakened, the Otto-
mans started to view the European powers as their equal. The difference was in 
general produced on the basis of being two different yet equal civilizations. From 
the nineteenth century onwards, the empire sought to enter into the European inter-
national society in order to get protection, especially against the increasing Russian 
threat. This attempt, which involved admitting half- heartedly the European superi-
ority, failed. After 1923, the universality of the West was admitted wholeheartedly 
and it was reciprocated by the European powers in the Treaty of Lausanne (1924). 
Turkey was admitted as an independent sovereign state and a member of modern 
law of nations (Khadduri, 1956). It started to produce its difference on the basis of 
being an autonomous sovereign nation- state. In short, from the empire to the 
republic, the mode of difference with the outside was demoted from the level of 
civilization to the level of nation- state.
 This new political community was a totality of three corresponding realities that 
were supposed to be constantly constructed through performative actions of the 
nation- state. This is because borders function very differently in the world of 
nation- states than the world of empires (Kratochwil, 1986). The borders are the 
existing limit points of the empire. They are rather the furthest post before the next 
move of enlargement. The borders are a gate to the outside world, not a wall that is 
used in the protection of the inside from the outside. Thus, for an empire, the 
outside is not absolute; it is rather contingent and relative. The whole world and 
human beings, in principle, belong to the empire, thus the whole world and human-
ity are perceived as the inside of the empire.
 The nation- state differs significantly in this respect. For a nation- state, the 
outside world is absolutely outside. Only the territory and human beings under its 
sovereign jurisdiction are considered as inside. The boundaries are final. They are 
rather the wall against which national territories and citizens should be protected. 
For that reason, a nation- state has to construct two corresponding realities, one 
within its territories and the other in the outside: the national and the international.
 These realities are to be constructed on the basis of a particular identity. 
Without an identity or ideology, the difference between inside and outside 
cannot be determined. The Turkish nation- state constructed these realities on the 
basis of the secular–national identity. In the domestic realm, the secular– 
nationalist nation claimed to represent the metaphorical totality of the society 
(Laclau, 2014). This hegemonic move led to two distinct policies. One was to 
integrate the people into this political whole by assimilating them through secu-
larist revolutionary laws (Yıldız, 2007). This involved an enforced identity 
change. This policy of assimilation into secular–nationalist identity was met 
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failure of that reaction, the religious–conservative groups retreated behind 
their own communal boundaries. Here, they established religious communities 
and gave priority to their communal ties rather than their citizenship status. 
The state and society in general were deemed as alien places.17 In order to re- 
establish ties with the society, the state put the so- called Turkish–Islamic syn-
thesis into practice after the 1980 military coup (Taşkın, 2006). This policy 
tried to hegemonize Islam (‘rationalizing Islam’ was one of the major argu-
ments in that context) within a nationalistic discourse and brought religious–
conservative sections of the society into the ‘national’ political community 
(Çetinsaya, 1999). One of the basic reasons behind this policy was the pres-
ence of a common enemy, the communist Soviets, on the outside and also the 
strengthening of the leftist politics in the 1970s.
 The other policy was to marginalize and make those people who resisted the 
policy of assimilation the enemy. The so- called 28 February Process in 1997 was 
a perfect example of how Islam and the religious–conservative sections of the 
society were made the enemy. The National Security Council gave a memoran-
dum to the coalition government on 28 February 1997 that reminded the secular-
ist red lines of the republican regime. The latter revolved around the protection 
of secularist revolutionary laws that were listed in the 174. Article of the Consti-
tution as follows: (1) Unification of education under a secular institutional 
framework, (2) wearing a Western- style hat, (3) closing down of the Darvish 
convents, madrasas and tombs, (4) enforcing the conduct of marriage act only by 
state officials, (5) admission of international (Western) numbers, (6) admission 
of the Latin alphabet, (7) abolishment of traditional epithets and titles (such as 
efendi, bey, paşa) and (8) prohibition of wearing special costumes such as reli-
gious gown and turban by the imams and other personnel of religious affairs. 
The purpose of these laws was said to be ‘uplifting Turkey to the level of modern 
civilization and protecting the secularist character of the Turkish Republic’.18
 The memorandum also presented a to- do list for the incumbent coalition gov-
ernment of Islamist Welfare Party (WP) and the centre- right True Path Party 
(TPP). This list included, among others, not to challenge the revolutionary laws, 
closing down of the Darvish convents that conflict with the revolutionary laws, 
not to encourage those who wear religious gown and turban, advising to bring 
back the 163 Article of the 1982 Constitution (which was lifted by Turgut Özal 
in 1991) that consisted of punishing those who resorted to a religious discourse 
in politics, readjusting the education policies according to the law on the unifica-
tion of education under a secular institutional framework, extending the compul-
sory education from five to eight years (which aimed at undermining the 
secondary section of religious vocational schools), closing down some of the 
religious vocational schools, containing the infiltration of ‘fundamentalist’ reli-
gious persons into the state, controlling the building of mosques, preventing the 
recruitment of those who were suspended from the military over accusations of 
anti- secularist activities in municipality services, closely monitoring the financial 
institutions and foundations under the control of religious orders, monitoring the 
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to be kept in line with the Constitution, and increasing the control over Iran’s 
activities that aim at destabilizing Turkey’s secular regime and taking the neces-
sary measures to contain them (‘28 Şubat Kararları’, 2002).
 As a result of that military intervention in 28 February, many female students 
wearing the headscarf were not allowed to enter into universities and were forced 
to leave their education incomplete. Many religious–conservative people were 
blacklisted and were prohibited from ever getting a job in the state. Moreover, 
many financial institutions and civil society organizations were kept under pres-
sure, if not closed down for good. This quasi- military coup was supported by 
secularist civil society organizations with slogans such as ‘one minute of dark-
ness for eternal light’.19 All of these Islamophobic policies that purged Islam and 
religious–conservative people from the political community were claimed to 
bring the state back to its factory settings after years of management of the 
country with a counter- revolutionary perspective since the 1940s.
 On the outside, there are two realities. One is regional, and the other inter-
national. The Turkish nation- state boosted a Westphalian regional order in its 
vicinity. This is because this state- centred order served to shape the imperial 
borders into nation- state borders. The boundaries in the region became absolute, 
providing a clear- cut division between the inside and the outside of the state. 
The transformation of boundaries through the Westphalian order was necessary 
in order to keep the secular regime floating. By recognizing other Muslim soci-
eties as distinct nations and equal sovereign entities, the traditional concept of 
Ummah, which stipulated the unity of Muslims, was discredited (Sayyid, 1997). 
The Westphalian order guaranteed not only military security but also the onto-
logical security of each nation- state and the post- imperial nationalist regimes in 
the region. Moreover, the Westphalian order established space for the Turkish 
state to create a distance from the Arabs, whom, in the secular Turkish mind, 
represented the ‘backward’ Islamic civilization. Relations with the Arabs were 
thus always kept underdeveloped and distant (Aykan, 1994).
 The Turkish nation- state also backed a Western- dominated international 
system. The reason for that was not only military security, but also the onto-
logical security of the Turkish state. The existence of the Turkish state was tied 
to the Western- dominated international system. The Turkish state allied with 
the West against the Soviets to sustain its national security, but that alliance 
was also stipulated in order to reproduce its secular–nationalist identity 
(Bozdağlıoğlu, 2004). Indeed, the Turkish state, or rather the republican regime, 
got its legitimacy from the universality of the Western civilization. The decline 
of the West would always jeopardize the security of the secular–national concep-
tion of the nation in domestic politics. This was the case in the 1990s when post-
modern ideologies and globalization became dominant. The questioning of 
modernity and the universality of the West put the secular regime in Turkey in a 
deep crisis (Erdoğan, 2009). The Turkish state in the Kemalist era, therefore, fol-
lowed Western interests in international politics, as long as the Western powers 
did not violate or disregard Turkey’s sovereignty and national existence as 
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Conclusion
Islamophobia was central to the construction and reproduction of the political 
community in Turkey for about a century. There were two sub- periods in the 
golden age of the politics of Islamophobia. The first was the transition from the 
empire to the nation- state and from the monarchical regime to the republican 
regime. The second was the construction and reproduction of a secular–nationalist 
nation- state. In the first period, Islamophobia was utilized to empty the locus of 
power from its dynastic content and demolish the empire. In the second period, 
Islamophobia was deployed to create a nation- state on the basis of a secular–
nationalist identity. This identity led to a secular–nationalist society in the 
domestic realm, backed by a Westphalian regional order and a Western- centric 
global order in its outside.
 This secular–nationalist political order, which attempted to make Islam and 
Muslims the enemy or as its outside, was opposed by the democratic alliance that 
was formed by religious–conservative masses and some sections of the bourgeois. 
These political forces opposed the authoritarianism of the secularist republican 
order and struggled to institutionalize democratic politics after the 1940s. However, 
they failed to institutionalize a democratic regime and dislocate the republican elite 
from the state until the 2000s. The republican elite carried out the politics of Islam-
ophobia very skilfully to push back on the democratic alliance.
 After the 1990s, the politics of Islamophobia started to backfire due to 
domestic and international developments. In the domestic realm, the religious–
conservative periphery poured into the cities and became very influential in pol-
itics. Whereas in the international realm, the international society, and especially 
the European Union, increased their pressure on the autocratic republican 
regime, criticizing its radical secularist (and also anti- Kurdish) policies. The 
regional instability, which was triggered by the collapse of neighbouring states, 
also made it very difficult for the secularist Turkey to continue its traditional 
foreign policy in the region. All these factors paved the way for the dislocation 
of the republican elite from the state, and thus the decline of the politics of 
Islamophobia in Turkey in the following decade.
Notes
 1 Yet the history of this phenomenon goes back to the end of the nineteenth century, see 
Bravo Lopez (2011).
 2 Attempts to create a ‘European Islam’ is one of the ways of hegemonizing Islam and 
Muslims. See Enes Bayraklı, Farid Hafez and Leonard Faytre, ‘Engineering a Euro-
pean Islam: An Analysis of Attempts to Domesticate Muslims in Austria, France and 
Germany’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2018, pp. 131–156.
 3 The notorious 163. Article of 1982 Constitution was providing the basis for those 
anti- democratic decisions. ‘Türkiye’de kapatılmış partiler’, NTV, 11 December 2009.
 4 The French law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols in schools bans 
wearing conspicuous religious symbols in French public or government- operated 






The politics of Islamophobia in Turkey  89
 5 See Anghie (2005) for a critique of this categorical thinking on international order. 
 6 In politics the friend is a social category on which different political actors come 
together on the basis of sharing ideational and material interests. According to this 
view, we have same identity and same interests with our friends. See Wendt, 1999. 
 7 For instance, when Turkey’s relations with the Western powers deteriorate, the secu-
larists got alarmed and put forward the argument that Turkey’s axis is shifting in 
foreign policy. ‘TESEV’in bulgularıyla eksen kayması’, Habertürk, 15 June 2010.
 8 ‘Muasır medeniyetler seviyesine ulaşmak’ (catching up with the modern civilization), 
which implies integration with the West or Westernization, is the motto of the repub-
lican elite. See Belge, 2009, pp. 29–43.
 9 This process of provincialization cannot be limited to the Islamic world. All non- 
European civilizations were subjected to the same cultural–political process. See 
Chakrabarty, 2000.
10 That’s why anarchy is the constitutive concept of modern international relations, see 
Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979.
11 This is the quintessential character of modern democratic politics. See Lefort, 1988, 
p. 17.
12 The meaning of kut is very close to Aristotle’s concept of political virtue or 
Machiavelli’s concept of virtù. See Inalcık, 1993, pp. 1–18.
13 Parliamentarism in essence added a new distinction, which is the government and the 
opposition, to the old distinction of the ruling and the ruled. It served to include the 
opposition into power. Alongside the periodical elections, Parliament, as another 
modern political institution, helped empty the locus of power by dividing power 
between the government and the opposition. See Luhmann, 1990.
14 The secularist forces added ‘justice’ to those three concepts. However, in time the 
secularists ceased to refer to justice in politics.
15 That means ‘sovereignty belongs to the people’.
16 The other major reason was Turkey’s relations with the US. In the post- Second World 
War period, Turkey had to carry out some of the basic requirements of democratic pol-
itics in order to be considered a member of the Atlantic Alliance against the Soviets.
17 Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, who is one of the leading intellectual figures in Islamist pol-
itics, cultivated these themes of alienation with the existing political order. See Duran, 
2005, pp. 129–156.
18 See the Turkish Constitution of 1982, www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf.
19 In those demonstrations many secularists, among other things, put off their lights for a 
minute at nine in the evening to display their displeasure with the government. See 
‘Sürekli aydınlık için bir dakika karanlık’, Bianet, 9 December 2014.
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